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 In 2002, an issue of  Wired  magazine featured the ex-
periences of a journalist who underwent the ‘world’s ﬁ rst 
top-to-bottom gene scan’. Developed as a prototype by a 
biotech company, this scan screens for a total of 77 ge-
netic disease markers, all of them linked to a person’s life 
expectancy. To his distress, the author learned that he had 
two mutations that raised his risk of a heart attack: 
 My face drains of color as the news sink in … I shouldn’t be 
surprised, since I’m told everyone has some sort of disease-causing 
mutation. Yet I realize that my decision to take a comprehensive 
DNA test has been based on the rather ridiculous assumption that 
I would come out of this with a clean genetic bill of health  [1 ,
p. 183]. 
 Puzzled as to how to interpret the screening results, he 
consulted a genetic counselor who informed him that ‘ge-
netic data are seldom clear-cut’, meaning that for most 
diseases, a positive genetic test result does not equal a 
100% chance of disease. But this lack of determinacy did 
not provide much comfort either, and ultimately, the 
journalist regretted having subjected himself to this cut-
ting-edge technology: the knowledge of the wicked muta-
tions ‘deep inside me will be nagging me every time I get 
short of breath’  [1 , p. 187]. 
 Soon the top-to-bottom gene scan will no longer have 
the ring of science ﬁ ction. In fact, hardly a month passes 
without a new entry in the already impressive list of in-
herited disorders and risk factors that can be detected 
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 Abstract 
 Objectives: Our aim is to provide an overview of key re-
search fi ndings from cognitive psychology regarding ef-
fective ways of communicating statistical  information, 
and to point out the implications of these fi ndings for 
genetic testing.  Method: We review the literature on the 
presentation of statistical information in diagnostic test 
results, discuss various representations that invite mis-
understandings, and propose alternative representa-
tions that foster understanding.  Results: Single-event 
probabilities, conditional probabilities and relative risks 
are easily misunderstood. Specifying the class of events 
to which a probability refers and using natural frequency 
statements improve understanding.  Conclusions: Cogni-
tive psychology has identifi ed simple and effective tools 
for improving statistical reasoning. They can help to im-
prove the public’s understanding of diagnostic test re-
sults. 
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through genetic testing. It is widely believed that genetic 
tests will soon be part of everyday medical care and will 
be key in detecting vulnerability to disease and to drug 
response in healthy individuals  [2] . 
 More Knowledge, More Certainty? 
 More knowledge does not necessarily mean more cer-
tainty, as the journalist of  Wired  magazine discovered 
with regret. He, like many people, seems to have project-
ed the illusion of certainty onto this new technology – a 
technology that more than other screening methods for 
health risks may prompt such an illusion because of its 
association with the typical image of genetic endowment 
as something akin to a ‘blue-print’ or a ‘program’  [3] . 
However, many excellent diagnostic technologies (e.g., 
DNA ﬁ ngerprinting, HIV tests, and gene scans) do not 
offer certainty. They merely promise to quantify in sta-
tistical terms the chance with which an event has occurred 
or will occur. Therefore, people need to come to terms 
with statistical information associated with the results of 
diagnostic technologies such as gene scans. 
 But how can people become competent consumers of 
crucial information rendered available by genetic tech-
nologies? A simple answer is by way of more knowledge. 
Indeed, despite the public’s interest in the topic of genet-
ic technologies, most people see themselves as only mod-
erately genetically literate  [2] . In addition, genetic coun-
seling practice reveals how difﬁ cult it is to reliably remove 
gaps in clients’ knowledge, and to convey risk information 
such that recipients understand and use it as intended by 
the counselors  [4, 5] . Like the  Wired magazine journalist, 
for instance, many recipients of genetic counseling appear 
to feel the need to convert statistical information (e.g., ‘a 
20% chance’) into categorical, deﬁ nite terms (e.g., high 
versus low risk), thus getting rid of the probabilistic aspect 
of the statement  [4] . The belief that more knowledge is the 
panacea to lack of understanding and, ultimately, accep-
tance of modern technologies also appears to underlie the 
 deﬁ cit model of the public’s understanding of science. In 
this model, the frail acceptance of modern technologies is 
traced to John Sixpack’s lack of accurate scientiﬁ c knowl-
edge about them  [6, 7] . Recently, however, the deﬁ cit 
model has been criticized on both empirical and theoreti-
cal grounds  [6–8] , and the debate about public acceptance 
of genetic technologies has turned to other variables such 
as the public’s lack of trust in science  [8] . 
 Without questioning the importance of trust as a pre-
requisite for the public’s acceptance of technologies, we 
focus on what we view as another key prerequisite, name-
ly, the insight that modern diagnostic technologies are not 
revelation machines that propel us from the twilight of 
probability. This insight, in turn, is closely linked with 
the public’s ability to understand and beneﬁ t from the 
statistical information that represents the typical out-
comes and foundation of diagnostic tests, for instance 
information about the accuracy of the test result or about 
the disease susceptibility that follows. 
 From Innumeracy to Insight 
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, the father 
of modern science ﬁ ction, the writer H.G. Wells, is re-
ported to have predicted that ‘statistical thinking will one 
day be as necessary for efﬁ cient citizenship as the ability 
to read and write’. At the end of the last century, the math-
ematician Paulos  [9] investigated how much – or rather, 
how little – progress people had made in this respect. In 
 Innumeracy, Paulos tells the story of a weather forecaster 
on American television who reported that there was a 
50% chance of rain on Saturday and a 50% chance of rain 
on Sunday, ergo, he concluded that there was a 100% 
chance of rain that weekend. 
 The inability to reason appropriately about probabili-
ties, however, is not an afﬂ iction limited to TV weather 
forecasters, but is widespread in many Western countries 
 [10] . Statistical innumeracy, we emphasize, is not simply 
a problem within the individual mind, or a problem of lack 
of knowledge. The problem lies in the failure to communi-
cate risk in understandable ways that allow a person to 
draw conclusions or inferences from the risks (e.g., the pre-
dictive value of a genetic test result). But how can risk be 
communicated to foster insight? Our conjecture is that cog-
nitive psychology has identiﬁ ed mind tools that can help 
laypeople and experts alike to improve their comprehen-
sion of statistical information. In what follows, we present 
representations of statistical information that invite mis-
understandings and hamper the ability to draw conclu-
sions from such information. We then propose alternative 
ways of representing the same statistical information that 
facilitate people’s understanding 1 . These representations 
work without explicit instruction. They work because they 
take into account that the cognitive algorithms of the mind 
are tuned to speciﬁ c representations of information. 
1 We focus on one aspect of representation of statistical information. Others, 
not discussed here, are the impact of visual presentation  [11–13] and framing 
 [14, 15] of statistical information.
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 Sources of Misunderstandings and How to 
Remove Them 
 Single-Event Probabilities 
 To communicate risk in the form of a single-event 
probability means to make a statement of this type: ‘The 
probability that an event will happen is x%.’ The state-
ment ‘Given the genetic test result, your chance of devel-
oping breast cancer is 85%’ is an instance of risk commu-
nication in terms of a single-event probability. Such a 
statement can be confusing, because a single-event prob-
ability, by deﬁ nition, leaves open the class of events to 
which the probability refers. 
 The following occurrence illustrates this ambiguity 
 [10] . A psychiatrist prescribed Prozac ®  to his mildly de-
pressed patients. He would inform them that they had a 
‘30–50% chance of developing a sexual problem’ such as 
impotence or loss of sexual interest. Hearing this, patients 
were concerned and anxious. After learning about the am-
biguity of single-event probabilities, the psychiatrist 
changed his way of communicating risks. He told patients 
that out of every 10 people to whom he prescribes Prozac, 
3–5 will experience a sexual problem. This way of com-
municating the risk of side effects seemed to put patients 
more at ease. The psychiatrist realized that he had never 
checked how his patients understood what ‘a 30–50% 
chance of developing a sexual problem’ meant. It turned 
out that many had thought that something would go awry 
in 30–50% of their sexual encounters. 
 The important insight from this doctor-patient inter-
action is that the psychiatrist’s initial approach to risk 
communication left the reference class unclear: does the 
30–50% chance refer to a class of people (patients who 
take Prozac), to a class of events (a given person’s sexual 
encounters), or to some other class? Whereas the psychi-
atrist’s reference class was the total number of his patients 
taking Prozac, his patients’ reference class was their own 
sexual encounters. It was only thanks to a coincidence 
that the psychiatrist chose a different way to communi-
cate the chances of side effects, thus realizing his patients’ 
previously unnoticed misunderstandings. 
 When risks are solely communicated in terms of sin-
gle-event probabilities, people have little choice but to ﬁ ll 
in a reference class spontaneously. This was demonstrat-
ed in a recent study that asked pedestrians in one Amer-
ican and four major European cities about their under-
standing of a probabilistic weather forecast (‘30% chance 
of rain tomorrow’)  [16] . Only in New York did a major-
ity of people supply the standard meteorological interpre-
tation, namely, that when the weather conditions are like 
today, in 3 out of 10 cases there will be (at least a trace 
of) rain the next day. In each of the European cities, this 
interpretation was judged as the least appropriate. The 
preferred interpretation in Europe was that it will rain 
tomorrow ‘30% of the time’, followed by ‘in 30% of the 
area’. In other words, even numerical probabilities can be 
interpreted by members of the public in multiple, possi-
bly contradictory ways. 
 The ambiguity of a single-event probability and the 
resulting misunderstandings are not limited to the under-
standing of the risks of side effects and precipitation. Sin-
gle-event probabilities can also have far-reaching conse-
quences when they are, for instance, used by expert wit-
nesses to explain DNA evidence in court  [17] , used by 
clinical psychologists and psychiatrists to predict the pos-
sibility that a mental patient will commit violent acts  [18] , 
and used by medical organizations to communicate the 
beneﬁ ts and risks of treatments  [10] . 
 The way to reduce confusion about what single-event 
probabilities mean is straightforward: always communi-
cate the reference class to which the single-event probabil-
ities pertain. For instance, ‘30% probability of rain tomor-
row’ does not refer to how long, in what area, or how much 
it will rain. It means that in three out of ten times when 
meteorologists make this prediction, there will be at least 
a trace of rain the next day. Alternatively, one may avoid 
confusion by replacing ambiguous single-event statements 
with frequentist statements. For instance, the psychiatrist 
may simply explain to his patients that ‘3 out of every 10 
patients have a side effect from this drug’  [15] . 
 Conditional Probabilities 
 Despite prior experience, patients have often only 
little knowledge about the accuracy of diagnostic tests 
 [19] . Limited knowledge, in turn, is often tantamount to 
the belief that the diagnostic tests are more accurate and 
more predictive than they actually are  [20] . Genetic test-
ing in particular is perceived to be extremely predictive, 
perhaps even infallible  [3, 17] . Thus, for many people, 
the fact that diagnostic tests do not produce certainty 
comes as a surprise. For instance, in a recent survey in 
the Netherlands, 32% of respondents thought that if pre-
natal tests such as chorionic villus sampling and amnio-
centesis came out negative, the child would deﬁ nitely be 
healthy  [2] . Believing that a negative test result means 
having zero risk is a misunderstanding that abets an il-
lusory sense of certainty. Such a misunderstanding stems 
in part from the way that the test results are presented 
 [21] . 
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 When attempting to comprehend results of genetic 
tests, people need to confront the fact that tests are not 
failsafe. Tests make correct as well as incorrect identiﬁ ca-
tions, and the chance of each comes, typically, in terms 
of  conditional probabilities. The following statement con-
veys the sensitivity of a test: ‘If a child has a genetic dis-
ease, the probability that prenatal test X turns out posi-
tive is 90%.’ Such conditional probabilities are in danger 
of being misunderstood. Speciﬁ cally, the conditional 
probability of a positive test result given a genetic disease 
(the sensitivity of a test) is confused with the inverse prob-
ability of genetic disease given a positive test result (the 
predictive value of a test). 
 Experts are not immune to this confusion. In one 
study, experienced doctors read the following informa-
tion about a screening test for colorectal cancer  [22] : 
 The probability of colorectal cancer in a certain population is 
0.3% [base rate]. If a person has colorectal cancer, the probability 
that the haemoccult test is positive is 50% [sensitivity]. If a person 
does not have colorectal cancer, the probability that he still tests 
positive is 3% [false-positive rate]. 
 The doctors were then asked to estimate the probabil-
ity that someone who tests positive actually has colorectal 
cancer. The correct estimate for the positive predictive 
value of the test is 5%. Yet, answers ranged from 1 to 99%, 
and every second doctor estimated the probability as 50% 
(the sensitivity) or 47% (the sensitivity minus false-posi-
tive rate). 
 The difﬁ culties that people have in reasoning with con-
ditional probabilities are often presented as if they were 
the natural consequence of ﬂ awed mental software  [23] . 
This view, however, overlooks the fundamental fact that 
the human mind processes information through external 
representations, and that selecting representations can 
improve or impair our understanding of statistical infor-
mation. Consider the following alternative representa-
tion of the above information: 
 Out of every 10,000 people, 30 have colorectal cancer. Of these 
30, 15 will have a positive haemoccult test. Out of the remaining 
9,970 people without colorectal cancer, 300 will still test positive. 
How many of those who test positive actually have colorectal can-
cer? 
 As before, the correct answer is 5%, i.e. 15 out of 315. 
In responding to this  natural frequency representation, 16 
out of 24 physicians gave the correct answer. In contrast, 
only 1 out of 24 physicians could give the correct answer 
when the statistical information was expressed as prob-
abilities  [22] . 
 As ﬁ gure 1 shows, representation matters because the 
statistical reasoning that is required, for instance, to cal-
culate the positive predictive value of a test (Bayesian 
reasoning) is relatively simple with natural frequencies, 
but becomes cumbersome the moment conditional prob-
abilities are introduced ( ﬁ g. 1 ). Studies that previously 
concluded that physicians  [24] and laypeople  [25] have 
great difﬁ culties in understanding the predictive value of 
test results, typically presented information in terms of 
probabilities and percentages. Natural frequencies, un-
like probabilities and percentages, carry implicit infor-
mation about base rates, thus reducing the number of 
computations required to determine the positive predic-
tive value of a test  [22] . Natural frequencies also corre-
spond to the way in which humans have experienced sta-
tistical information over most of their history [for a dis-
cussion of this and alternative explanations, see ref.  26] . 
 Representing risk in terms of natural frequencies fos-
ters statistical reasoning. This ﬁ nding is robust for lay-
people and experts  [27–29] . Although the beneﬁ cial effect 
of natural frequencies occurs without providing more 
knowledge through training or instruction – just by chang-
ing the representation of information – people can be 
explicitly encouraged to translate conditional probabili-
ties into natural frequencies. Tutorials teaching people to 
change representations rather than having them apply 
mathematical formulas (the formula needed to solve the 
diagnostic inference problem mentioned above is Bayes’ 
rule) turn out to be much more effective in improving 
diagnostic inferences  [30, 31] . 
 Relative Risks 
 In addition to single-event probabilities and condi-
tional probabilities, there is another source of misunder-
standings in communicating risk: relative risks. What is 
the beneﬁ t of mammography screening on the risk of dy-
ing from breast cancer? Women who ask this question 
often hear the following answer: by undergoing mammog-
raphy screening, women aged over 40 years reduce their 
risk of dying from breast cancer by 25%. This number is 
a  relative risk reduction, which is the absolute risk reduc-
tion divided by the proportion of patients who die with-
out undergoing screening. This number is mute on the 
underlying raw frequencies. The frequencies for these 
data are derived from four Swedish randomized trials for 
women between 40 and 74 years of age  [32] . Out of 1,000 
women who did not participate in mammography screen-
ing, 4 died of breast cancer. Out of 1,000 women who did 
participate in mammography screening, 3 died of breast 
cancer. Screening thus saved the life of one out of four 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
: 
Un
ive
rs
itä
ts
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 M
ed
izi
n 
Ba
se
l  
   
   
   
   
   
  
13
1.
15
2.
21
1.
61
 - 
10
/2
3/
20
17
 4
:3
9:
11
 P
M
 How to Foster Statistical Reasoning  Community Genet 2006;9:197–203 201
women who would otherwise have died from breast can-
cer, which is a reduction of 25%. 
 Relative risk reduction is not the only way to represent 
the beneﬁ t of mammography. Alternatively, its beneﬁ ts 
can be framed in terms of  absolute risk reduction,  name-
ly,  the proportion of women who die from breast cancer 
without undergoing a mammography screening minus 
those who die despite being screened. Screening reduces 
the number of people who die from 4 to 3 in 1,000. That 
is, the absolute risk reduction is 1 in 1,000, which is 0.1%. 
Still another representation of the same information is 
the  number needed to treat, which is the number of people 
who must participate in the screening to save one life. 
This number can be derived from the absolute risk reduc-
tion. The number of people who needed to be screened 
to save one life is 1,000, because the screening prevents 
1 in 1,000 deaths. 
 The relative risk reduction looks more impressive than 
the absolute risk reduction. Health organizations inform 
patients about the beneﬁ ts of mammography screening 
almost exclusively in terms of the relative risk reduction, 
and perhaps not surprisingly, people are more likely to 
prefer an intervention if it is advertised in terms of rela-
tive risk reduction rather than in absolute risk reduction 
 [10, 33] . It has been suggested that people draw wrong 
conclusions from relative risk reduction. Indeed, the fact 
that people frequently overestimate the beneﬁ ts of screen-
ing programs  [20] is consistent with the possibility that 
they assume that the relative risk reduction (e.g., 25%) 
applies to those who participate in screenings when in fact 
it refers to the people who die of the disease without hav-
ing been screened. 
 All three representations of the raw frequencies are 
correct. Yet, they do suggest different amounts of beneﬁ t, 
Probabilities Natural frequencies
C & pos
15
10,000
p(C) = 0.003
= 0.50
= 0.03
30
9,970
p(pos C)
p(pos C)¬
p p(C) (pos C)
p p p(C) (pos C) + ( C) ¬ p(pos C) ¬
(0.003)(0.50)
(0.003)(0.50) + (0.997)(0.03)
=
p(C ) =pos
=
C & pos + ¬C & pos
15 + 300
Colorectal
cancer (C)
No colorectal
cancer ( C)¬
1515 300 9,670
Test
positive
Test
negative
Test
positive
Test
negative
p(C ) =pos
 Fig. 1. Explanation of why natural frequencies facilitate the computation of the probability  p ( C   pos ) of cancer 
given a positive test (a form of Bayesian reasoning). The symbols  C and  ¬C stand for  colorectal cancer and  no 
colorectal cancer , respectively, and  pos stands for a  positive  test result. One can see that Bayes’ rule for probabili-
ties involves more calculations than that for natural frequencies. 
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and thus, are likely to elicit different expectations. We 
propose that risk can be communicated more effectively 
in terms of absolute reduction, rather than in terms of 
relative risk reduction. At a minimum, both pieces of in-
formation should be provided  [15] . 
 Statistical Information: Numbers or Words? 
 Relative risk reduction, single-event probabilities, 
and conditional probabilities are frequently used to in-
form patients about the outcomes and consequences of 
medical test results. There is strong consensus that health 
professionals, especially in the case of genetic counseling, 
are ethically obliged to provide such statistical informa-
tion, thus enabling patients to make informed decisions 
 [5] . The alternative representations that we have out-
lined can foster patients’ understanding of statistical in-
formation. 
 Notwithstanding the power of alternative numerical 
presentation, it is sometimes suggested that numerical 
information should be replaced with simple verbal cate-
gorizations of risk (‘high’ or ‘low’ risk). Admittedly, en-
abling people to thoroughly understand numerical ex-
pressions of risk is not a trivial task  [34] , and alternative 
representations will not invariably succeed. However, 
numbers appear to be better suited than words for com-
municating risk. First, verbal quantiﬁ ers such as ‘high’ or 
‘moderate’ are less precise than numbers, thus inviting 
more varied interpretations and achieving even less ac-
curate understanding  [11, 21 ; but see  35 for an exception]. 
For example, what is ‘unlikely’ for a counselor might well 
be ‘likely’ for the patient  [11] . Second, even though most 
people like to provide information in categorical terms, 
they prefer to receive information numerically when they 
have to base a decision on it  [36] . For instance, in genet-
ic counseling for breast and ovarian cancer, 73% of the 
counselees expressed a preference for the risk to be de-
scribed in quantitative formats  [37] . In addition, a nu-
meric statement of risk can increase trust in and comfort 
with the risk information, compared with a purely verbal 
statement  [38] . To conclude, even though people often 
translate numerical into categorical risk information dur-
ing their decision making process  [4] , they expect num-
bers to begin with, and they appear to beneﬁ t more from 
numbers than from words – if represented in the right 
way. Thus, as H.G. Wells purportedly predicted, statisti-
cal thinking is indeed indispensable for efﬁ cient citizen-
ship, whether the citizen is a patient, a doctor, a lawyer, 
or a consumer of the daily weather report. 
 Conclusions 
 All-encompassing genetic screening promises to pro-
vide us with previously unimaginable ways of responding 
to the risks of diseases. Whether this promise will be ful-
ﬁ lled, however, will in part also depend on whether people 
come to terms with the fact that the new diagnostic tools 
are not omniscient. They do not produce certainty, but 
they quantify previously unobservable risks. One step to-
ward overcoming the illusion of certainty is to be able to 
reason statistically. There is, of course, more to the coun-
seling process than good statistical reasoning on the part 
of the counselor and the client, respectively  [5] , but with-
out statistical reasoning, the best technology will be of 
little value. 
 Innumeracy, in turn, cannot simply be overcome by 
trite calls for more knowledge about diagnostic technolo-
gies. More information will not automatically produce 
better-informed citizens and higher levels of public wel-
fare. Instead, information has to be communicated intel-
ligibly. For this reason, new technologies need psychology 
 [28] . Cognitive psychology provides an understanding of 
how people process statistical information, thus enabling 
the design of simple but powerful mind tools for improv-
ing statistical reasoning. The public need not suffer from 
the tyranny of too much information, but should beneﬁ t 
from its smart representation. 
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